In 1841 and 1842, eight states and the Territory of Florida defaulted on their sovereign debts.
Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, and Mississippi-repudiated their debts, in part or in whole. In every case repudiation was connected to state borrowing for bank investments. But Alabama, which also had banking problems, did not default. Section V discusses why, in the Northwest, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan defaulted, but Ohio did not. Similarly, section VI considers why, in the commercial-industrial Northeast, Maryland and Pennsylvania defaulted, but Massachusetts and New York did not. Section VII summarizes the lessons we draw from the debt crisis.
I
Why did some indebted states default while others did not? A simple explanation jumps out of Table 1 , which reports total and per capita state debts in 1841, whether a particular state defaulted, and whether it repudiated. Table 2 gives the dates of defaults, repudiations, and resumptions. Nine of the ten states with the highest per capita debts defaulted. Although three states with large total debts (more than $10 million) and per capita debts above the median ($6.45) did not default, the most obvious question to ask is, why did some states borrow so much? It is a question that previous students of the debt crisis have not asked. We study the timing and regional patterns of borrowing in Section II, and answer the question in Section III.
(For the most part, we ignore the states in Table 1 that were at or below the median of per capita debt since none defaulted.) As did Callender, we divide the states into three regions: Northeast, Northwest, and South.
Instead of asking why some states borrowed so much, politicians at the time focused on the debt crisis itself and asked how states could have gotten into such an embarrassing mess.
Typically, the answers fell into two categories: "incompetence" and "corruption." The incompetence theme stressed that voters and state legislatures were naïve, poorly informed, and too optimistic when, observing both New York's amazing success with the Erie Canal and the energizing economic and fiscal effects of state-chartered banks in the Northeast, they authorized large amounts of borrowing for transportation and banking projects that were expected to pay for themselves.
The corruption theme stressed that states were defrauded when politicians and promoters lied about the costs and returns of improvement projects, when corrupt politicians ignored lending restrictions and misallocated state funds, when promoters and contractors lined their own pockets while building substandard projects, and when banks financed by state debt or intermediating state debts did not deliver on their promises. Since it was easier to dupe voters and legislators when they were naïve and poorly informed, the incompetence and corruption themes are not mutually exclusive.
Modern economists and economic historians tend to favor a third explanation, namely that defaulting states were "unlucky." States made what appeared ex ante to be good decisions, but ex post those decisions turned out to be bad ones when macroeconomic circumstances beyond the control of states confounded them. Economists prefer the "unlucky" explanation, as it requires neither incompetence nor corruption. But it ran a distant third in the early 1840s for politicians who needed scapegoats when the default crisis hit. Incompetence and corruption then dominated the politics of default, and the two ever since have colored most accounts of the crisis.
The distinction in the 1840s between incompetence and corruption was critical in one respect. States that defaulted on and then repudiated debts invariably repudiated because they felt they had been victimized by corruption. In contrast, states that defaulted on, but did not repudiate, debts usually concluded they had been incompetent. Default and repudiation were distinct policies. We explain below why states chose one or the other, and in some cases a combination of the two.
Distinctions between incompetence, corruption, and bad luck mattered not only at the time, but also in later accounts of the debt crisis. Most writers agree that the U.S. economy from the early 1830s through the early 1840s experienced severe macroeconomic fluctuations. Price levels inflated up to 1837, when a nationwide financial panic broke out in May, leading banks to suspend convertibility of bank money to base money for a year. The economy recovered in 1838 and 1839, but another banking crisis in October 1839 was followed by bank suspensions of convertibility in the South and West until 1842. A third banking crisis came in the winter of 1842.
1 Although we will show that the panic of 1837, contrary to some accounts, had little effect on state borrowing, there is consensus that states were caught unprepared by the economic depression that lasted from late 1839 into 1843. In the depression, we among others concluded, when returns on state investments in banks and transportation projects dried up or failed to materialize, states defaulted on their debts. Was this incompetence? Historian Marvin Meyers articulates the incompetence theme in holding that states were naïve, projects were poorly designed from the start, and when expected revenues from improvement investments failed to materialize, states defaulted. Davis Dewey and others argued that state defaults resulted from a kind of ethical corruption: states were unwilling to raise taxes enough to service their debts even when they could have done so. Peter Temin presents the "unlucky" explanation: when domestic and international sources of capital dried up in 1839, states were unable to borrow and had to stop work on their projects; when projects could not be completed and revenues from them therefore failed to materialize, states defaulted. From these and other accounts, we can derive three generalizations commonly used to explain why state debt defaults occurred: expected revenues from improvement projects failed to materialize; states were unwilling to raise taxes to meet their debt service obligations; and capital flows to states dried up in and after 1839. Unfortunately, these generalizations fit moderately well only one of the nine defaulting states, Pennsylvania. We show in Section VI that Pennsylvania was an unusual, not a typical, case. Nonetheless, it is possible to explain the timing and regional characteristics of state borrowing, the emergence of state fiscal crises, whether a state defaulted or did not, and whether a defaulting state repudiated or did not.
Although no simple explanation works for all states, we show that there are essentially three regional patterns of default and non-default, corresponding to the Northeast, Northwest, and Southern regions. We move first to the timing and regional patterns of debt incurrence.
II
The most complete survey of state borrowing as of 1841 is Congress's William Cost Johnson Report. 6 The congressional investigators compiled a complete legislative history of debt authorization by state and year. Table 3 presents the report's series for total debt outstanding on September 1, 1841, by state and year of authorization. Since debt authorized in one year may have been issued in later years, the data do not represent debt issued by year. But since the totals give debt outstanding, we can be confident that debt issued was in the year of authorization or later, a matter of some importance here. The Hence, about half the answer to the question of why states borrowed so much is that these five states had been borrowing successfully for many years.
What about the other half? Why did newer western states start borrowing suddenly and heavily in the late 1830s? Why did the northeastern states and Ohio resume borrowing then?
Why, apart from the closing of the Second Bank's branches, was there so much new bank investment after 1836 in the Old Southwest? We give a general answer to all these questions in Section III. Before proceeding to that, there is one more question suggested by, but not seen in Table 3 , that we need to address.
How did the states propose to service their debts? Essentially there were four models.
One was New York's. When New York began the Erie Canal in 1817, the canal's financial prospects were uncertain. So the state funded canal debts by dedicating two revenue sources to debt service: auction duties and a salt tax. In 1824, the proceeds of these two taxes amounted to $290 thousand, which was nearly enough to service canal bond interest of $350 thousand.
Moreover, canal tolls, even though the project was still not completed, generated more revenue than had been expected. New York put the surplus of dedicated taxes and canal receipts into a sinking fund, the Canal Fund, and was easily able to service and redeem its debts. The New
York model was to raise taxes when borrowing began. Pennsylvania, in contrast to New York, did not raise taxes when it began issuing debt to finance its transportation projects in 1828. Instead, from the beginning Pennsylvania borrowed money to pay debt interest, counting on expected canal toll revenues to service the debt when the system was to be completed in 1835. As a result, Pennsylvania had to borrow more money than New York to finance a given amount of canal construction, and its debts increased over time as the state borrowed more and more to cover interest payments. Since unlike New York, Pennsylvania did not build up resources in a sinking fund, it was unable to purchase debt on the market when conditions were favorable. The Pennsylvania model was to borrow, pay interest with the proceeds of more borrowing, and delay taxing until such time as it became absolutely necessary. The state hoped taxes would never have to be levied.
Mississippi, whose internal improvements were entirely in banking, followed still a third model. When the state invested in a bank, it did so by issuing bonds to the bank to purchase bank stock. The bank was required, by explicit terms in its state charter, to service both interest and principal on the state bonds from dividends on the state's bank stock. Although the state pledged its faith and credit to the bonds, it never intended to pay either interest or principal on the debt. The Mississippi model was to issue debt that the state never intended or expected to service with tax revenues.
A fourth and more generally applicable model was to service debt with the revenue proceeds of an expanding tax base, in particular by means of property taxes on land, the timehonored mainstay of U.S. state and local taxation. The land boom of the 1830s was accompanied by rising land values, and the outlook appeared good for servicing debts from growing property tax revenues that would soon materialize. Improvement projects, in the eyes of some sponsoring states, would even help to expand the tax base further. This was the model especially of states in the Northwest. Older, more developed states found that they could follow the New York, Pennsylvania, and Mississippi models, and virtually dispense with property taxation. Eventually, after the crisis hit, they too were forced to follow the property tax model.
III
If the most striking feature of state borrowing is the sharp increase after 1836, another striking feature of state finance up to 1842-the height of the default crisis-is the declining importance of the property tax as a source of state revenue in many states. The primary alternatives to property taxation were taxes on business (fees, licenses, and capital taxes) and revenues from state investments, mostly in the stock of banks. How were these states able virtually to eliminate property taxes? Massachusetts earned more than half of its ordinary revenues from a tax on bank capital. In New York, dividends from bank investments, business taxes, and growing revenues from the Erie Canal enabled the state to abandon its property tax in 1826. Pennsylvania and Maryland had investments in banks and were able to tap a variety of business taxes; neither had had a property tax since the 1790s.
Georgia and Alabama were enabled to eliminate their property taxes in the early 1830s because their investments in banks yielded increasing dividend revenues.
Since these states, mostly in the Northeast, had low or no property taxes, they had a substantial alternative revenue source in reserve. The Treasury of a well-managed Government, is the pockets of the people, in which something should be placed by wise legislation, before much is required. To borrow money at a fair rate of interest, and expend it upon some well selected objects of paramount public utility, will not embarrass the Government or impoverish the people, but on the contrary will enrich both. If the interest is annually raised by taxation, the ability of the people to pay these taxes is proportionally increased, because the principal of the debt is expended among them.... This is not mere speculation; it is theory based upon reason and abundantly verified by facts and experience. (Riker and Thornbrough, Noble Papers, p. 320; emphasis added.) The generalization that states expected improvement-project revenues to service debts incurred to finance them, but then those expectations went unfulfilled, is invalid as a general explanation of the debt crisis. its property tax from a per-acre to an ad valorem tax, and gave the state auditor the authority to raise tax rates to cover debt service. Thus, states that were uncertain about future revenues from transportation projects followed the New York model and provided for tax increases when they issued bonds. 15 But more confident states followed the Pennsylvania and Mississippi models.
Evidence that confidence was building, or that expectations were changing, or both can be found in the decisions of Pennsylvania and Maryland not to raise taxes when they began their canal projects. Pennsylvania followed a borrow-as-you-go policy right up to its default in 1842.
When New York and Ohio began their second wave of transportation investment in the late 1830s, and Massachusetts joined in, none of them raised taxes. Southern states never expected to service the bonds they issued to banks and, as a result, did not raise taxes when they issued debt either.
By 1836, increasing land values were the common factor underlying state fiscal policies, bank investments, and transportation improvements nationwide. Northeastern states knew they had large amounts of untaxed land, which was rising in value. It was a fiscal reserve against which they could borrow to finance extensions of transportation systems begun earlier under state auspices. Land values were rising elsewhere in the country as well. Western states, north and south, were in the midst of the greatest land boom in American history. In the Northwest, if
states were uncertain about just when transportation investments would generate revenues, they nonetheless anticipated that many more, and more valuable, acres soon could be taxed. States were thus confident that property tax proceeds would provide adequate fiscal resources to service the debts they incurred.
The older states along the Atlantic coast had long and generally favorable fiscal experiences with chartering, investing in, and taxing banks. In the South, that was enough to justify large bank investments. These banks would lend to planters on the security of lands appreciating in value. Loans allowed the planters to buy more land to extend their operations.
And their interest payments to the banks, generating dividends on a state's stock purchased with state bonds, would more than cover the debt service. Most of the repudiated southwestern state bonds had been invested in so-called land banks or plantation banks. 16 States purchased shares of stock in a bank by issuing state bonds to the bank. Private investors-these were mixed enterprises-also purchased stock in the banks by giving mortgages on their lands, usually to twice the value of the stock. The planterstockholders were then able to borrow from the bank to purchase new lands and slaves, and for other purposes. The bank's liquidity derived from selling the state bonds, and its main assets were land mortgages.
In every case, the land bank was responsible for servicing the state debt that had been issued to it from dividends paid on the state's stock in the bank. 17 In no case was a state directly responsible for servicing its debt, although when Louisiana chartered its first planter banks in 1824 the state assumed a contingent liability. Louisiana did not repudiate that liability after the bank failed, although it did repudiate other state debts issued to banks whose charters did not have the contingent state liability. 18 More usual was a clause like this one from the 1837 charter of the Union Bank of Mississippi: "That to secure the payment of the capital and interest of said bonds, the subscribers shall be bound to give mortgage … on property, to be in all cases equal to the amount of the stock…." 19 Even when a state pledged its "faith" as security for debt service, the bondholders' first recourse in the event of default was to the mortgaged lands of planterstockholders, not to the state.
The structure and functioning of land banks created several problems that became acute when the banks began to fail in 1839. First, unlike transportation improvements that benefitted all landowners along their routes, the benefits of land banks were highly concentrated among the wealthy planter elites holding stock in the banks and borrowing from them. When the banks failed, political and popular sympathies were not on the side of bankers and bank stockholders.
As Florida's governor put it in 1841, "What right had a few hundred stockholders to make the whole people … and their posterity … groan under a load of debt for these institutions?" 20 After land banks failed and state bonds went into default, state politicians searched hard for reasons not to honor public debts incurred for the benefit of banker and planter elites.
Such reasons were not hard to find. A second problem arose from the way land banks marketed state bonds. States purchased stock in banks by giving them state bonds, and the banks then sold the bonds. But states put restrictions on the bond sales, such as requiring that bonds be sold at or above par. In many cases, the banks did not honor the restrictions, providing legal pretexts for subsequent repudiation.
Third, in an example of what would later be called "insider lending" or "crony capitalism," the banks had incentives to overvalue lands. Bank directors represented the stockholders, namely planters whose ability to purchase bank stock and obtain bank loans on mortgage security depended on the appraised value of their lands. In the booming 1830s, loans were made on inflated and inflating land values. In 1839, land values began to fall, and bank stockholder-borrowers often found the value of their mortgages were greater than the market value of their lands. 21 So they defaulted on their mortgages. The banks then could not make interest payments on state bonds. When bondholders asked states to make the payments, the states told them that their security was the mortgaged lands, from which they might seek recourse. The cozy relationship between banks managers and borrowers contributed to a popular perception that banks and bankers were corrupt.
Mississippi was the notorious repudiator. In 1830, it chartered the Planter's Bank, issuing $2 million of state bonds to purchase two-thirds of the bank's authorized capital stock of $3 million, and making the bank the state's fiscal agent. By the charter, the bank paid interest on the state bonds from dividends on the state's stock. Mississippi chartered a number of other banks in the years 1833 to 1837, but did not issue any new debt to them or acquire an interest in them. 22 As financial conditions tightened in 1836, Mississippi laid plans for another land bank, the Union Bank, to be capitalized at $15.5 million, with about half of that to be provided by issuing state bonds. The original bill passed on January 21, 1837, before the panic in May of that year. Mississippi's constitution required that any bill authorizing debt issuance be passed twice, at two consecutive sessions of the legislature, before becoming law. The 1837 bill passed again on February 5, 1838. It was amended ten days later to reduce the state's subscription to $5 million, and to stipulate that the bonds were not to be sold at less than par.
23
The amended bill passed only once, not twice. Nonetheless, the state issued the bonds to the bank, and then on August 18, 1838, the Union Bank's commissioners contracted with Nicholas Biddle to sell the bonds to the Bank of the United States of Pennsylvania (BUSP). The contract specified that the bond proceeds were to be paid in five equal installments the following year, but that interest commenced as of August 18, 1838. Further, to make the bonds negotiable abroad, the contract made the bonds payable in England at the rate of four shilling, six pence per dollar. The effect of each of the two contract provisions was to sell the bonds at less than par value, contrary to the amendment that had authorized their issue.
24
The Union Bank was grossly mismanaged and covered up its extensive losses. That was known to the state well before the bank failed to meet interest payments on Mississippi's bonds in 1841. 25 The state never paid any interest on the bonds, and it formally repudiated them in Mismanaged, the two banks failed and were liquidated by the state in the early 1840s.
Ostensibly the bank debt remained in default for many years, and arrears of interest accumulated.
After the Civil War, Arkansas, either formally (on grounds of charter violations) or informally repudiated most of its debts. 27 Florida, while still a territory, issued $4 million in bonds, mostly for banks. Its Union Bank alone received $3 million. The bank's agent, in violation of the charter, sold the bonds at less than par in Europe. Like other U.S. banks, the Florida banks suspended convertibility in 1837; unlike most banks, their insolvency quickly became apparent. "The funds of the banks were loaned to the stockholders, and the only security given to the banks was the land to purchase and pay for which the money was borrowed." 28 The territory never paid interest on the bonds issued to banks, and effectively repudiated them in 1842. In addition to charter violations, Florida claimed that as a territory it had no legal authority to issue the bonds in the first place.
One may wonder who had been the more naïve -Florida in issuing the bonds, or investors in purchasing them. Bank notified the state that it would not be able to meet its obligations, and it was joined in its default that year by other credit-sale lenders. 32 The "suspended" debt (issued but not paid to the state) was estimated at $3.381 million, of which $2.146 million was for bonds issued to Morris
Canal and Banking Company. Fortunately, we can see how Indiana planned to service its canal debts. In 1836, the Indiana Board of Internal Improvement reported estimates of anticipated annual interest payments, toll revenues, investment revenues, and property tax revenues available to the finance construction.
These figures were only for internal improvements, over and above expenditures and revenues for ordinary activity, and do not include the Bank debt. 35 The first column of Table 8 , column 3. 39 We assume that the total debt was $10 million, interest payments were $500 thousand a year, property tax rates were 4 mills, and land was valued at $7.05 an acre. 40 Indiana taxed personal wealth; we assume that personal wealth would have remain unchanged, line (9).
Summing projected land value and personal wealth gives line (7), and when multiplied by .004
gives the projected property tax revenues shown in line (5). At those rates and values, the state would have been able to service the debt and cover normal operating expenses out of property tax revenues in 1842. The counterfactual analysis leads to a clear conclusion: Indiana defaulted in 1841 because land values declined.
Indiana confounds all three generalizations used to explain the default crisis. First, Indiana did not default because credit markets dried up in 1839. The state had already sold its bonds. The Morris Bank default, not the state's inability to sell bonds in London, brought construction to a stop. Second, Indiana did not default because expected canal tolls failed to materialize: the state had expected in 1836 to receive only $120 thousand from tolls in 1842, far less than its interest obligations, and even that was an optimistic estimate. Third, Indiana did not default because it was unwilling to raise tax rates. Indiana taxpayers were willing to accept a tax rate of 4 mills, the highest real rate of any state at the end of the 1830s, if it meant avoiding default ( Table 7) . Property tax revenues were $393,248 in 1842, compared to only $44,537 in 1835. When the state resumed interest payments in 1848, the property tax rate was again raised to 4 mills. Western states were willing to raise tax rates to very high levels to service their debts.
What defeated their efforts was the shrinking size of their tax bases.
Illinois was in a similar position to Indiana, although it started its transportation projects even later. Illinois also had to cope with bank default on credit sales of bonds in 1839. So the state began borrowing heavily to meet interest payments after 1839 (Table 3) . Like Indiana, Illinois raised property taxes in an effort to stave off default. We do not have land values for Illinois, and so cannot compute tax rates, but tax revenues per acre of land increased significantly between 1840 and 1842 as the state attempted to stave off default (Panel B, Table 7 ). This is clear evidence of a willingness in Illinois to bear substantial costs to avoid default. In the end, however, the money Illinois borrowed after 1839 was a mistake. The state struggled to resume interest payments and did not fully settle its obligations to its creditors until the 1850s.
Michigan in 1837 authorized $5 million in bonds for a variety of transportation investments throughout the state. The first bonds were sold in 1838, and then the state entered into negotiations with the Morris Bank to take the remaining bond issue of $3.7 million. The bank took the bonds on credit, promising to repay the state in quarterly installments of $250
thousand. 41 The bank was required to resell the bonds at par or better. Later in the year, the Morris Bank entered into an arrangement with the BUSP, in which the BUSP took three quarters of the Michigan bonds and agreed to make installment payments directly to the state. In the spring of 1840, the Morris Bank, after defaulting on a similar arrangement with Indiana, defaulted on its obligation to Michigan. The BUSP continued to make payments to Michigan until it went out of business in February of 1841. When the BUSP defaulted, Michigan stopped paying interest. In April 1842, the state repudiated $2,342,960 in bonds for which it claimed it had never received payment. Michigan defaulted on all of its debts, but eventually repaid the bonds for which it received payment. Michigan repudiated the disputed bonds. Illinois and Indiana might have done the same with respect to bonds for which they were never paid. But rather than repudiating, they chose eventually to settle with their creditors. This shows again that choices are made in crises; few things are inevitable. In 1839, the October suspension of the BUSP, growing interest payments, depressed business conditions, and disappointing toll revenues brought the state to the brink of default.
Rather than raise taxes, Pennsylvania chose to borrow nearly $4 million more in 1840 by drawing on its advantageous credit line with the BUSP. By 1841, the state was unable to sell bonds at par (the governor had been authorized to borrow up to $3.1 million on that basis) and the failure of the BUSP precluded additional loans from that source. 54 Still the state legislature refused to implement a realistic property tax that might have enabled it to avoid default.
In August 1842, Pennsylvania defaulted, issuing script bearing interest at five percent and payable at a later date for the amount of interest due. 55 Later in 1842, the state enacted a 2-mill property tax, but it would be several years before the tax began to produce sufficient revenues to service its debts. Pennsylvania never considered repudiation. It maintained from the time of the default that it would pay all of its debts. The issue of state scripts to meet interest payments in 1842 and after was evidence of its relative good faith. Pennsylvania resumed interest payments on February 1, 1845, funding the scripts into new bonds.
Why did Pennsylvania default at all? It came down to a reluctance to impose a property tax. One student of the state's financial history put it quite simply: "Speculation and hatred of all forms of direct taxation were the causes of the downfall in Pennsylvania's credit." 56 Many
Atlantic seaboard states had virtually eliminated their property taxes by the 1830s (see Table 4 ).
Pennsylvania had not had a property tax on real property since 1800. The state delayed the creation of a property tax until default was upon it, and then it took time for tax revenues to materialize. Revenues in 1842 were only $480 thousand; in 1843, $553 thousand; and in 1844, $751 thousand. When property tax revenues reached $1,318 thousand in 1845, Pennsylvania resumed servicing its debts, including funded interest arrears, to all bondholders (Panel A, Table   7 ). Had Pennsylvania's 2-mill tax raised $1 million in 1842, the state would not have had to default. Had Pennsylvania imposed a realistic property tax in 1836, when it became apparent that the State Works would not produce the needed revenues, the state certainly would not have defaulted. The unwillingness to levy an adequate and effective property tax was the primary cause of the Pennsylvania default.
Pennsylvania is the only defaulting state for which we can say that all three stylized explanations of the debt crisis apply. The state made poorly planned and executed transportation investments that failed to produce expected revenues. When the state was unable to borrow more money at par in 1842, it was forced to default. And Pennsylvania proved unwilling to raise property taxes in a timely manner that could have avoided its default.
Maryland's default has some similarities to Pennsylvania's, and also some differences.
Unlike Pennsylvania, which built and operated its improvement projects, Maryland borrowed to invest in the stocks and bonds of companies chartered to build and operate the projects.
Maryland's railroad investments, notably in the Baltimore & Ohio, generated investment revenues roughly sufficient to service the state debts incurred on their behalf, but the state's investments in canal companies, notably the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, yielded no revenues.
In 1838, in an attempt to rescue the canal, Maryland borrowed an additional $8.775 million; most of the bonds were issued in 1839. In March 1841, facing impending default, Maryland imposed a property tax. That was a year and a half before Pennsylvania did the same, and Maryland hoped it would prevent a default. That hope was dashed when a number of counties challenged the state's right to tax them in the courts, and other anticipated revenues were not realized.
Maryland defaulted in January 1842. As legal challenges to taxation were parried, property tax revenues rose (Panel A, The states have been accused of an unwillingness to raise taxes to services debts.
Certainly this was true of southern repudiators. But every northern state raised taxes and/or tax rates in the early 1840s, as did Alabama in the South. The rapidly rising property tax collections documented in Panel A of Table 7 are eloquent testimony to states willingness to raise taxes.
States in the Northwest simply ran out resources to tax. Had Pennsylvania and Maryland implemented realistic state property taxes a few years earlier, they would not have defaulted.
We also shed light on the importance of incompetence and corruption in bringing on the default crisis. The old northeastern states possessed the administrative and financial ability to execute their canal and railroad investments. But Pennsylvania and Maryland were dilatory in levying adequate taxes. The newly settled northwestern states were pushing the envelope of financial responsibility. We have shown that Indiana could have continued to service its debts, following its original plan, but only if land values stayed at their 1837 levels. Whether or not Indiana's expectations were naive is a difficult question to answer. Southern states were in a different situation. By the 1830s, banks had long been a safe and stable investment for state governments. That said, Florida, Mississippi, and Arkansas invested in banks whose managements were less than circumspect. Corruption in banks, or at least charges of corruption-what later would be called crony capitalism-played a role in every state that repudiated debt. In Michigan it was the default of the Morris Bank, an established eastern bank rather than a bank the state had invested in, that led to the state's default and partial repudiation.
The distinct regional patterns-northeast, northwest, and south-of the debt crisis and of regional responses to it imply to us that the United States at that time, although under one federal government, was less a nation or country in the usual sense, and more akin to an empire of different geographic and economic regions at different stages of economic development. Like the British Empire of that era, the United States had its commercial-industrial center (similar to Great Britain) in the northeast, its semi-tropical cash-crop exporting area (its India) in the South, and its temperate region of recent settlement (its Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) in the old northwest. Like the British Empire, the United States consisted of states and regions loosely integrated by trading and financial networks. Since our analysis of the debt crisis found previous general explanations of it wanting, we suspect that generalizations about the United States based on the assumption that it was a country like most other countries in the nineteenth century could prove misleading. In economic comparisons with Western European countries, for example, the northeastern United States might be an entity more relevant than the entire U.S. empire of diverse regions and different stages of development.
What about lessons of the U.S. state debt crisis for contemporary emerging markets?
Much as in emerging markets today, the biggest problems in the default crisis occurred in new states where populations were rapidly expanding and governments were attempting to finance valuable social infrastructure investments on a narrow tax base. Perhaps the lessons to be drawn are the same lessons that American states drew in the 1840s. First, that government borrowing
should not occur without a simultaneous increase in taxation. Alexander Hamilton argued in the 1790s that whenever a public debt is incurred, it ought to be accompanied by tax increases sufficient to service the interest and over time to redeem the principal. In the era of internal improvements, Hamilton's precept was honored mostly in the breach. Between 1842 and 1852, however, eleven states wrote new constitutions that embodied such procedural debt restrictions requiring state governments to raise taxes when bonds were issued, and to obtain voter approval of tax increases in bond referenda. 59 Second, states learned that they should be leery about investments in private corporations that tied state credit to the actions of private individuals. States throughout the country began prohibiting state and local ownership of private company stock in the 1840s. State constitutions began requiring that state legislatures pass general incorporations acts for banks (free banking), manufacturing, and other forms of corporations. Several states made the creation of "special" corporations unconstitutional as well. By opening entry to all who wanted a corporate charter,
states made it more difficult for politicians to create spheres of common interest between project promoters and legislators. This undermined tendencies toward crony capitalism.
Third, emerging market societies might learn that American state and local governments did not conclude from the debt crisis that they should cease promoting economic development through public investment in transportation and finance. The backlash from the debt crisis in the 1840s did not to stop state and local governments from borrowing again for such purposes, or even waiting long before doing so. Louisiana borrowed to build railroads in the 1850s and New York voters approved a bond issue to expand the canal network in the 1850s as well. States continued to charter banks, sometimes with public investment in them. What American states did learn from the debt crisis was that how decisions were made about the financing of investment projects could be as important as what projects were selected in determining whether outcomes would be successful or embarrassing. 
A Note on Sources:
The debts of the states are variously recorded in State Auditor and Treasurer's reports for the early 19 th century in ways that often make it difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct exactly how much debt was owed by each state in each year. In 1843, a congressional report, the "Report of William Cost Johnson," (27 th Congress, 3 rd Session, Report #296), estimated state debt outstanding on September 2, 1841. Their method involved tracking each piece of legislation authorizing state debt, the amount authorized, and how much of the authorized debt remained outstanding in 1841. As noted in the text, this produces an annual series of debt authorized rather than debt issued. The 1880 Census abstracted numbers from the "Johnson Report," Census of Wealth, Debt, and Taxation. The Census numbers were repeated by Ratchford in State Debts. We have reassembled the detailed data from the "Johnson Report" which forms the basis of Tables 1 and 2 . None of the results in this paper would be affected by more detailed research on the debt series for individual states: the orders of magnitude are correct and the timing is, as noted, biased to dating authorization before the issue date.
The dates of default and repudiation were taken from English, "Sovereign Default."
We have consulted the original state reports at length. They form the basis for the public finance data assembled by Sylla, Legler, and Wallis. Information in Tables 4 and 6 was taken from original state reports between 1830 and 1850. Table 5 was taken from Gates, Public Lands, Appendix B, p. 802. 35,066 22,177 19,023 20,741 5,713 3,156 5,798 198,030 20,470 21,285 7,901 4,775 The sterling price used in the agreement was the long-standing conventional exchange rate, not the prevailing market exchange rate, which was 9 percent higher than the official rate and reflected the gold contents of the dollar and the pound. Convention rated the pound at $4.44, whereas the mint-par rate was $4.86. In effect the contract required the Union Bank to repay $1,095 in principal for every $1,000 it received from the BUSP. 40 The total state debt in 1841 was $12,751,000. This amount included the bonds issued to the State Bank, which the state would eventually redeem by swapping its stock in the bank for the bonds, and the $1,500,000 in short term debts issued after 1839 in an attempt to stave off default. The $10,000,000 figure is appropriate for evaluating the internal improvement debt. Nominal tax rates were high in Ohio because of low assessment rates. Once a property was put on the tax rolls, it typically was not reassessed, so assessed values lagged far behind true values. When a reassessment was finally undertaken in 1847, total assessed value rose from $150 million to $450 million and the state was able to reduce tax rates fell from 8 mills to 2.75 mills, without reducing revenues, see Panels A and B of Table 7 . This is the basis for the assertion in the text that the real tax rate in Ohio was never higher than 3 mills.
46 47 "During the remainder of 1842, the fund board sustained installment payments on the three-year loans by issuing bonds to Ohio banks at prices of 70 to 75. In this manner, nearly $700,000 of bonds were sold for cash payments of only $500,000. Even these sales might have been impossible had the Barings not once again come to the aid of the board: for in late May, the Barings purchased $400,000 of bonds at the distressingly low price of 60. A sale at 60 per cent of face value was hardly an expression of unbounded confidence, and yet any sale whatever of American securities was astonishing news in the London money market of 1842. Not least important, the Barings purchase enabled the fund board to pay the July 1842 interest to bondholders as scheduled." Scheiber, Ohio Canals, p. 152. Sales of 6 percent bonds at 60 implied only a 10 percent interest rate.
For more details on Ohio bonds in London and New York see Kim and Wallis "Bond Markets."
The flexibility that Ohio possessed was merely procedural. The Ohio politicians would still bear political costs for allowing property taxes to be raised. 
